<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:wfw="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
	xmlns:slash="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/slash/"
	>

<channel>
	<title>The Law Offices of Abbas Hadjian &#187; Abbas Hadjian Family Law</title>
	<atom:link href="http://abbashadjian.com/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://abbashadjian.com</link>
	<description></description>
	<lastBuildDate>Tue, 20 Dec 2011 23:23:54 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<language>en</language>
	<sy:updatePeriod>hourly</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>1</sy:updateFrequency>
	<generator>http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3</generator>
		<item>
		<title>California: 2002 Prenuptial Agreement Act not Retroactive</title>
		<link>http://abbashadjian.com/2011/06/california-2002-prenuptial-agreement-act-not-retroactive/</link>
		<comments>http://abbashadjian.com/2011/06/california-2002-prenuptial-agreement-act-not-retroactive/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 01 Jun 2011 17:41:59 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Admin</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Appellate Reviews]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[On California Law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[California,]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Prenuptial Agreement,]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Spousal Support,]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://abbashadjian.com/?p=937</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Waived Spousal Support in Prenuptial Agreement of 1999, Cannot be Invalidated Based on the 2002 Law San Diego, California, May 24, 2011: Court of Appeal of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division One held that a spousal support waiver in the parties&#8217; 1999 premarital agreement cannot be invalidated based on the  Fam. Code, § 1612, subd. (c), enacted [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Waived Spousal Support in Prenuptial Agreement of 1999, Cannot be Invalidated Based on the 2002 Law</span></h2>
<p><strong>San Diego, California, May 24, 2011</strong>: Court of Appeal of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division One held that a spousal support waiver in the parties&#8217; 1999 premarital agreement cannot be invalidated based on the  Fam. Code, § 1612, subd. (c), enacted in 2002. The court of appeal held that § 1612, subd. (c), requiring legal representation by the spouse who waives the spousal support was a material change in the law as to enforceability of a spousal support waiver and the Legislature did not intend it to apply retroactively.<br />
In addition, there was substantial evidence that the wife entered into the agreement voluntarily, was advised but refrained from obtaining  legal counsel, understood the agreement, and there was no evidence of  duress, fraud, or undue influence. Wife argued that she signed the agreement without the benefit of having an attorney,  under duress of having the preparation for the parties&#8217; wedding was contracted and completed, and that canceling the wedding would have created great embarrassment.</p>
<p><strong>For the complete texts of the Decisions, send an e-mail to Admin.</strong></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<div><span style="color: #333333; font-family: Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: normal;"><br />
</span></div>
]]></content:encoded>
			<wfw:commentRss>http://abbashadjian.com/2011/06/california-2002-prenuptial-agreement-act-not-retroactive/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>California: Belief in Cultural Marriage if in Good Faith may be Unreasonable</title>
		<link>http://abbashadjian.com/2011/06/california-belief-in-cultural-marriage-if-in-good-faith-may-be-unreasonable/</link>
		<comments>http://abbashadjian.com/2011/06/california-belief-in-cultural-marriage-if-in-good-faith-may-be-unreasonable/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 01 Jun 2011 17:14:34 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Admin</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Appellate Reviews]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[On California Law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[California,]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Cultural Marriage,]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Culture,]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Validity of Marriage,]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://abbashadjian.com/?p=930</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[California Appellate Court, 6th District (Santa Clara): Vryonis decision (1988) invalidating Iranian Cultural Marriage was erroneous Santa Clara, California, April 19, 2011: In Ceja v. Rudolph &#38; Sletten, Inc., the California Appellate Court for the 6th District held that an innocent party to an invalid marriage would be entitled to marital benefits even if her/belief were [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div>
<h1><span style="font-size: 13px; font-weight: normal;"><span style="text-decoration: underline;"><strong><span style="font-size: 15px;">California Appellate Court, 6th District (Santa Clara):</span></strong></span><span style="font-size: 15px; font-weight: bold;"><br />
<strong><em>Vryonis decision (1988) invalidating Iranian Cultural Marriage was erroneous</em></strong></span></span></h1>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p><strong>Santa Clara, California, April 19, 2011</strong>: In <em>C</em><em>eja v. Rudolph &amp; Sletten, Inc.</em>, the California Appellate Court for the 6<sup>th</sup> District held that an innocent party to an invalid marriage would be entitled to marital benefits even if her/belief were unreasonable. By this holding, the court disagreed with more than two decades of California law reflected in the case of “In re Marriage of Vryonis”, decided in 1988, which declared that good faith belief in validity of marriage must be reasonable. In Vryonis the court rejected claim of an Iranian woman who believed her private cultural marriage to her Greek husband was valid, although it was made in her home, without obtaining a marriage license as required by California law.<br />
In Ceja, after death of her Husband at work, Mrs. Ceja brought action for wrongful death, but Husband’s employer moved for summary judgment claiming that as a matter of law, Mrs. Ceja did not qualify as a putative spouse because at the time of marriage knew that her Husband is married. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment, applying an objective test for putative status. The court found that it was not objectively reasonable for Mrs. Ceja to have believed that her marriage was valid.</p>
<p>The appellate court disagreed. The court believed that good faith belief in validity of marriage asks whether that person actually believed the marriage was valid and whether he or she held that belief honestly, genuinely, and sincerely, without collusion or fraud. The court disagreed with In re Marriage of Vryonis, which held that the statutory language incorporates an objective test. The court found that:<br />
1. The concept of putative spouse, allowing marital benefits to a spouse even if the marriage is defective is a judicially created relief and the judicial definition of the putative spouse required only a good faith belief in the validity of a marriage.<br />
2. The Legislature codified that definition without intending to change it.<br />
3. The Vryonis court engrafted an objective test to the statutory definition based on the legally unsupported view that “good faith belief” necessarily incorporates an objective standard.<br />
4. The Vryonis court intruded upon the Legislature’s prerogative. The courts have followed and uncritically accepted Vryonis decision but the policy of stare decisis carries little weight. Despite its widespread acceptance, Vryonis created a conflict with prior cases. The rule of statutory construction is inapplicable, because there is an unresolved conflict in the judicial holdings.</p>
<p><strong>For the complete texts of the Decisions, send an e-mail to Admin.</strong></p>
<p><strong><br />
</strong></p>
</div>
</div>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<wfw:commentRss>http://abbashadjian.com/2011/06/california-belief-in-cultural-marriage-if-in-good-faith-may-be-unreasonable/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>■ WASHINGTON: Afghani/Islamic Mahr Not Enforceable As A Prenuptial Contrcat</title>
		<link>http://abbashadjian.com/2010/08/washington-afghaniislamic-mahr-not-enforceable-as-a-prenuptial-contrcat/</link>
		<comments>http://abbashadjian.com/2010/08/washington-afghaniislamic-mahr-not-enforceable-as-a-prenuptial-contrcat/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 19 Aug 2010 06:53:20 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Admin</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Appellate Reviews]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Afghan,]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Afghanistan,]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Bridal Gift,]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Canada,]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Culture,]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Dowry,]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Farsi,]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Islam,]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mahr,]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan,]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Prenuptial Agreement,]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Washington,]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://abbashadjian.com/?p=755</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Islamic Mahr Is  Not Enforceable Against Afghani  Groom Who Did Not Read, Write, or Spoke Farsi Washington, February 23, 2010: Husna (Wife, 19 ) from Canada, and Khalid (Husband, 26) from U.S., are children of Afghan immigrants. They married in an Islamic marriage ceremony in Washington, during which Khalid promised in writing to make an &#8220;immediate&#8221; [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Islamic </span><span style="text-decoration: underline;"><em>Mahr</em></span><span style="text-decoration: underline;"> Is  Not Enforceable Against Afghani  Groom Who Did Not Read, Write, or Spoke Farsi</span></h2>
<p><span style="font-size: 13.2px;"><strong>Washington, February 23, 2010</strong>: Husna (Wife, 19 ) from Canada, and Khalid (Husband, 26) from U.S., are children of Afghan immigrants. They married in an Islamic marriage ceremony in Washington, during which Khalid promised in writing to make an &#8220;immediate&#8221; cash gift of  $100.00, and a &#8220;future&#8221; gift of $20,000.00, to Husna as her <em>Mahr</em> (i.e. dowry a traditional Afghani-Islamic Bridal Gift).</span></p>
<p>Upon filing for divorce by Husna 13 months later, she requested, and the trial Court ordered Khalid to pay $20,000.00  as a valid contractual obligation to Husna.  Court of Appeals of Washington, Division Three, Case No. 27616-3-III, disagreed and reversed.</p>
<p>The Court found that Khalid did not speak, read, or write Farsi, and did not know about the Mahr until 15 minutes before he signed the agreement. An uncle explained the obligation to Khalid after he had signed it. The Court found that the agreement was not enforceable under neutral principles of contract law.</p>
<address>[<strong>Note by Abbas Hadjian</strong>: The reader is cautioned that opinion of the Appellate Court of Washington contains errors in defining and/or  understanding the <em>Mahr</em> and the  Islamic marriage.  <em>Mahr</em> is not a "prenuptial agreement". Is a religiously sanctioned  promise by the Groom to make (present and/or future) cash gift to the Bride. Is normally negotiated by the Bride and Groom relatives in advance of the wedding, and disclosed at the ceremony and recorded in the marriage certificate. In many Islamic cultures a marriage without <em>Mahr</em> is not valid.</address>
<address>The marriage itself, is like a Christian wedding, and includes religious uttering,  but is not  "an engagement ceremony", which usually is conducted few months/weeks before. It establishes and solemnizes the martial relationship between the parties religiously, whether or not the marriage is civilly recorded or recognized. ]</address>
]]></content:encoded>
			<wfw:commentRss>http://abbashadjian.com/2010/08/washington-afghaniislamic-mahr-not-enforceable-as-a-prenuptial-contrcat/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>■ LOUISIANA: Right To Cultural Upbringing Belongs To Both Parents</title>
		<link>http://abbashadjian.com/2010/08/%e2%96%a0-louisiana-right-to-cultural-upbringing-belongs-to-both-parents/</link>
		<comments>http://abbashadjian.com/2010/08/%e2%96%a0-louisiana-right-to-cultural-upbringing-belongs-to-both-parents/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 19 Aug 2010 04:40:46 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Admin</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Appellate Reviews]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Culture,]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Custody & Visitation,]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Louisiana,]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://abbashadjian.com/?p=875</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Trial Court Erred In Awarding Right of Religious and Cultural Upbringing Solely to the Custodial Parent Louisiana, March 10, 2010: D.R.S. (Father) and L.E.K. (Mother) were not married, but had a child. The family Court gave Mother physical custody, with sole right of determining religious and cultural  upbringing of the child. Father was  awarded visitation only. [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Trial Court Erred In Awarding Right of Religious and Cultural Upbringing Solely to the Custodial Parent</span></h2>
<p><strong>Louisiana, March 10, 2010</strong>: D.R.S. (Father) and L.E.K. (Mother) were not married, but had a child. The family Court gave Mother physical custody, with sole right of determining religious and cultural  upbringing of the child. Father was  awarded visitation only. On appeal by the Father, Court of Appeals of Louisiana, Third Circuit reversed.</p>
<p>The Court, in Case of <strong>D. R. S. </strong><strong>v. </strong><strong>L. E. K., </strong><strong>Nos. 09-1274-09</strong><strong>-1275, </strong>found “Though the custodial or domiciliary parent may raise the child in a legitimate religion of his/her own choosing, that parent may not force that religion or religious affiliation upon the noncustodial parent or preclude the noncustodial parent from pursuing his/her own religious affiliation and sharing same with the child provided doing so does not negatively affect the best interests of the child. There is no statutory nor jurisprudential authority to support the trial court’s ruling that the custodial or domiciliary parent has the sole authority to mandate “what belief system is presented to the child in . . . any home in which the child visits or resides.”</p>
<address><strong>For the complete texts of the Decisions, send an e-mail to Admin.</strong></address>
]]></content:encoded>
			<wfw:commentRss>http://abbashadjian.com/2010/08/%e2%96%a0-louisiana-right-to-cultural-upbringing-belongs-to-both-parents/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>■ U.S. SUPREME COURT: Culture, Determinative Factor in International Child Abduction</title>
		<link>http://abbashadjian.com/2010/08/%e2%96%a0-u-s-supreme-court-culture-determinative-factor-in-international-child-abduction/</link>
		<comments>http://abbashadjian.com/2010/08/%e2%96%a0-u-s-supreme-court-culture-determinative-factor-in-international-child-abduction/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 17 Aug 2010 04:44:26 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Admin</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Appellate Reviews]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Chile,]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Custody & Visitation,]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hague Convention,]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ICARA,]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[United States Supreme Court,]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://abbashadjian.com/?p=858</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Judges Must Avoid Imposing Their Own Cultural Preferences in Hague  Convention Disputes Washington, May 17, 2010: Mr. Abbot, British, married, Mrs. Abbot,  U.S. citizen, had a child, A.J.A.,  in Hawaii, and lived in Chili, where they got divorce. Under Chilean law, Mrs. Abbot received custody of A.J.A., and Mr. Abbot was granted the visitation with the right [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Judges Must Avoid Imposing Their Own Cultural Preferences in Hague  Convention Disputes</span></h2>
<p><strong>Washington, May 17, 2010:</strong> Mr. Abbot, British, married, Mrs. Abbot,  U.S. citizen, had a child, A.J.A.,  in Hawaii, and lived in Chili, where they got divorce. Under Chilean law, Mrs. Abbot received custody of A.J.A., and Mr. Abbot was granted the visitation with the right of stopping A.J.A. from leaving Chile without his permission (called &#8220;ne exeat&#8221;).</p>
<p>In violation, Mrs. Abbot removed A.J.A. from Chile to Texas, where Mr. Abbot (first through the State, and then the Federal Court for the Western District) sought to return A.J.A. under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (Convention) and the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA), back to Chile.</p>
<p>Neither the State, nor the Federal District Court in Texas, sided with Mr. Abbot, that the &#8220;ne exeat&#8221; is a custody right. The U.S. States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.</p>
<p>The United States Supreme Court in an opinion filed May 17, 2010,  disagreed and reversed.</p>
<p>The Court in its opinion noted that  Mr. Abbot&#8217;s right to decide A. J. A.&#8217;s country of residence gives him rights to determine the shape of his early and adolescent years and his language, identity, and culture and traditions.</p>
<p>The Court found that few decisions are as significant as the language the child speaks, the identity he finds, or the culture and traditions she will come to absorb.</p>
<p>The Court observed that &#8220;Judges must strive always to avoid a common tendency to prefer their own society and culture, a tendency that ought not interfere with objective consideration of all the factors that should be weighed in determining the best interests of the child. &#8221;</p>
<address><strong>For the complete texts of the Decisions, send an e-mail to Admin.</strong></address>
]]></content:encoded>
			<wfw:commentRss>http://abbashadjian.com/2010/08/%e2%96%a0-u-s-supreme-court-culture-determinative-factor-in-international-child-abduction/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>■ MISSOURI: Cultural Development &amp; Cellular Phone</title>
		<link>http://abbashadjian.com/2010/08/%e2%96%a0-missouri-cultural-development-cellular-phone/</link>
		<comments>http://abbashadjian.com/2010/08/%e2%96%a0-missouri-cultural-development-cellular-phone/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 16 Aug 2010 05:44:34 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Admin</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Appellate Reviews]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Child Support,]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Missouri,]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://abbashadjian.com/?p=830</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[No Evidence That Expense Of The Cellular Phone Was Necessary for Children’s Cultural Development Missouri, July 6, 2010: Father objected, but Mother asked and the trial court included payment for the children’s cell phone costs an extraordinary expense,as additional child support. Father appealed, and Missouri Court Of Appeals, Western District reversed. The Court, in the Case of Pickering. v. [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2><span style="text-decoration: underline;">No Evidence That Expense Of The Cellular Phone Was Necessary for Children’s Cultural Development</span></h2>
<p><strong>Missouri, July 6, 2010: </strong>Father objected, but Mother asked and the trial court included payment for the children’s cell phone costs an extraordinary expense,as additional child support. Father appealed, and Missouri Court Of Appeals, Western District reversed.</p>
<p>The Court, in the Case of<strong> Pickering. v. Pickering, WD71489</strong>, noted that Mother did not provide any  evidence that the children’s use of cell phones is integral to, or even associated with, an activity intended to enhance the athletic, social or cultural development of the children.</p>
<address><strong>For the complete texts of the Decisions, send an e-mail to Admin.</strong></address>
]]></content:encoded>
			<wfw:commentRss>http://abbashadjian.com/2010/08/%e2%96%a0-missouri-cultural-development-cellular-phone/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>■ WISCONSIN: Hmong’s Cultural Marriage no Defense to Sexual Assault on Minor</title>
		<link>http://abbashadjian.com/2010/08/%e2%96%a0-wisconsin-hmong%e2%80%99s-cultural-marriage-no-defense-to-sexual-assault-on-minor/</link>
		<comments>http://abbashadjian.com/2010/08/%e2%96%a0-wisconsin-hmong%e2%80%99s-cultural-marriage-no-defense-to-sexual-assault-on-minor/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 16 Aug 2010 04:38:11 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Admin</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Appellate Reviews]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Cultural Marriage,]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hmong,]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Wisconsin,]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://abbashadjian.com/?p=823</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Failure of Attorney to Raise Existence of Cultural Marriage No Basis to Reverse Criminal Conviction Wisconsin(March 4, 2009) : Mong Lor was convicted for the crime of sexual assault on a child under sixteen.  Post conviction, Lor brought a motion for postconviction relief arguing that his trial counsel should have argued a cultural marriage defense.  He claimed that the minor, [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Failure of Attorney to Raise Existence of Cultural Marriage No Basis to Reverse Criminal Conviction</span></h2>
<p><strong>Wisconsin(March 4, 2009)</strong> : Mong Lor was convicted for the crime of sexual assault on a child under sixteen.  Post conviction, Lor brought a motion for postconviction relief arguing that his trial counsel should have argued a cultural marriage defense.  He claimed that the minor, 14, was married to him by the elders of the Hmong families, but the marriage was not registered under the law of the State of Wisconsin.  The victim, according to Lor, brought the charge of sexual assault of a child after the marriage fell apart.</p>
<p>The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, District II, found that Wisconsin did not recognize a cultural marriage defense and thereby Lor cannot seek relief due to the  ineffective assistance of counsel.</p>
<address><strong>For the complete texts of the Decisions, send an e-mail to Admin.</strong></address>
]]></content:encoded>
			<wfw:commentRss>http://abbashadjian.com/2010/08/%e2%96%a0-wisconsin-hmong%e2%80%99s-cultural-marriage-no-defense-to-sexual-assault-on-minor/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>■ NEW JERSEY: Cultural Intent vs. Criminal Intent</title>
		<link>http://abbashadjian.com/2010/08/%e2%96%a0-new-jersey-cultural-intent-vs-criminal-intent/</link>
		<comments>http://abbashadjian.com/2010/08/%e2%96%a0-new-jersey-cultural-intent-vs-criminal-intent/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 16 Aug 2010 04:22:31 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Admin</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Appellate Reviews]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[New Jersey,]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://abbashadjian.com/?p=803</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Moroccan Belief In Non-consensual Sex, Insufficient to Deny Restraining Order Bayonne, New Jersey(July 23, 2010): S. D. (Wife) requested an order for final domestic violence protection order against M.J.R. (Husband).  Both Husband and Wife are  Muslims and Moroccans. The Trial Court denied the order and found that  in punishing Wife and having non-consensual sex with her, Husband lacked the requisite criminal intent and believed is [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Moroccan Belief In Non-consensual Sex, Insufficient to Deny Restraining Order</span></h2>
<p><strong>Bayonne, New Jersey(July 23, 2010):</strong> S. D. (Wife) requested an order for final domestic violence protection order against M.J.R. (Husband).  Both Husband and Wife are  Muslims and Moroccans.</p>
<p>The Trial Court denied the order and found that  in punishing Wife and having non-consensual sex with her, Husband lacked the requisite criminal intent and believed is permitted to do so.  Wife appealed. The Court of Appeals of New Jersey, in an opinion filed on <strong>July 23, 2010</strong>, reversed the trial Court’s order, and found that Trial Court’s conclusion cannot be sustained because “Defendant’s conduct in engaging in nonconsensual sexual intercourse was unquestionably knowing, regardless of his view that his religion permitted him to act as he did”.</p>
<address><strong>For the complete texts of the Decisions, send an e-mail to Admin.</strong></address>
]]></content:encoded>
			<wfw:commentRss>http://abbashadjian.com/2010/08/%e2%96%a0-new-jersey-cultural-intent-vs-criminal-intent/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>■ OHIO: Cultural Custody Requires Cultural Activities</title>
		<link>http://abbashadjian.com/2010/08/%e2%96%a0-ohio-cultural-custody-requires-cultural-activities-2/</link>
		<comments>http://abbashadjian.com/2010/08/%e2%96%a0-ohio-cultural-custody-requires-cultural-activities-2/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 16 Aug 2010 04:10:39 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Admin</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Appellate Reviews]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Custody & Visitation,]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ohio,]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://abbashadjian.com/?p=787</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Chinese Father Who Did Not Involve Child in Cultural Activities Cannot Complain From Adverse Custody Order Ohio (July 10, 2010): Father, Chinese, appealed from a domestic relations division order denying him shared custody time with the eight year child of the marriage.  Father claimed that denial of custody time, limits his ability to introduce the child to the Chinese [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2><strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Chinese Father Who Did Not Involve Child in Cultural Activities Cannot Complain From Adverse Custody Order</span></strong></h2>
<p><strong>Ohio (July 10, 2010):</strong> Father, Chinese, appealed from a domestic relations division order denying him shared custody time with the eight year child of the marriage.  Father claimed that denial of custody time, limits his ability to introduce the child to the Chinese culture.</p>
<p><strong> </strong></p>
<p>In Case of<strong> </strong>Kong v. Kong, Court Of Appeal Of Ohio for the Eighth Appellate District, County Of Cuyahoga, disagreed. The Court noted that Father failed to testify or provide evidence at trial showing that the child was participating in any cultural or heritage-based activities that would be curtailed as a result of an order denying shared parenting.</p>
<address><span style="font-size: 13.2px;">For the complete texts of the Decisions, send an e-mail to Admin.</span></address>
]]></content:encoded>
			<wfw:commentRss>http://abbashadjian.com/2010/08/%e2%96%a0-ohio-cultural-custody-requires-cultural-activities-2/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>■ CALIFORNIA: Culture &amp; Proposition 8</title>
		<link>http://abbashadjian.com/2010/08/%e2%96%a0-california-culture-proposition-8/</link>
		<comments>http://abbashadjian.com/2010/08/%e2%96%a0-california-culture-proposition-8/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 16 Aug 2010 01:44:14 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Admin</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[On California Law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[California,]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Validity of Marriage,]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://abbashadjian.com/?p=777</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[References to Culture in the Historical Ruling of Judge Walker on Unconstitutionality of Proposition 8 California(August 4, 2010): Judge Vaughn R. Walker,  Chief Judge,  the United States District Court for The Northern District Of California, ruled that California  Proposition 8, the voter-enacted amendment to the California Constitution in November 2008, is unconstitutional. Proposition 8 provides [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;">References to Culture in the Historical Ruling of Judge Walker on Unconstitutionality of Proposition 8</span></strong></p>
<div>
<div><strong>California(August 4, 2010):</strong> Judge Vaughn R. Walker,  Chief Judge,  the United States District Court for The Northern District Of California, ruled that California  Proposition 8, the voter-enacted amendment to the California Constitution in November 2008, is unconstitutional.</div>
<div>Proposition 8 provides that:  ”Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California.”</div>
<div>
<div>In his ruling, Judge Walker found that Proposition 8, violates the due process and equal protection rights of the same-sex couples who wish to get married, including 18, 000 same sex couples who has already obtained their license to get married.</div>
<div>In the ruling, titled:</div>
</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS AND TRIAL EVIDENCE</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">CREDIBILITY DETERMINATIONS</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">FINDINGS OF FACT</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">CONCLUSIONS OF LAW</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">ORDER</div>
<div style="text-align: left;">Judge Walker made reference to testimony of many witnesses who addressed the issue of same-sex marriage from the cultural point of view.</div>
<div>Here are quotations of the ruling referring to culture.</div>
<div>.</div>
<div><span style="text-decoration: underline;"><strong>Three Rules of Marriage across Cultures and Times</strong></span></div>
<div id="_mcePaste">Page 14: “Blankenhorn identified three rules of marriage (discussed further in the credibility determinations, section I below), which he testified have been consistent across cultures and times: (1) the rule of opposites (the &#8220;man/woman&#8221; rule); (2) the rule of two; and (3) the rule of sex. Tr 2879:17-25.”</div>
<div>.</div>
<div id="_mcePaste"><span style="text-decoration: underline;"><strong>Cultural Esteem of Marriage vs. Domestic Partnership</strong></span></div>
<div id="_mcePaste">Page 19: ”Peplau testified that little of the cultural esteem surrounding marriage adheres to domestic partnerships.</div>
<div>.</div>
<div id="_mcePaste"><span style="text-decoration: underline;"><strong>Cultural Understanding of Danger to Children</strong></span></div>
<div id="_mcePaste">Pages 20-21: “Historian George Chauncey testified about a direct relationship between the Proposition 8 campaign and initiative campaigns from the 1970s targeting gays and lesbians; like earlier campaigns, the Proposition 8 campaign emphasized the importance of protecting children and relied on stereotypical images of gays and lesbians, despite the lack of any evidence showing that gays and lesbians pose a danger to children. Chauncey concluded that the Proposition 8 campaign did not need to explain what children were to be protected from; the advertisements relied on a cultural understanding that gays and lesbians are dangerous to children.</div>
<div id="_mcePaste">This understanding, Chauncey observed, is an artifact of the discrimination gays and lesbians faced in the United States in the twentieth century&#8230;.”.</div>
<div id="_mcePaste">.</div>
<div><span style="text-decoration: underline;"><strong>Cultural Variations of  Same-sex Marriage</strong></span></div>
<div id="_mcePaste">Pages 36-37: ”Young has been a professor of religious studies at McGill University since 1978. PX2335 Young CV. She received her PhD in history of religions and comparative religions from McGill in 1978. Id. Young testified at her deposition that homosexuality is a normal variant of human sexuality and that same-sex couples possess Page 37 the same desire for love and commitment as opposite-sex couples. PX2545 (dep tr); PX2544 (video of same). Young also explained that several cultures around the world and across centuries have had variations of marital relationships for same-sex couples. Id. “.</div>
<div id="_mcePaste">.</div>
<div><span style="text-decoration: underline;"><strong>Cultural Rule of Two</strong></span></div>
<div id="_mcePaste">Page 43: “ Blankenhorn testified that his research has led him to conclude there are three universal rules that govern marriage: (1) the rule of opposites (the &#8220;man/woman&#8221; rule); (2) the rule of two; and (3) the rule of sex. Tr 2879:17-25. Blankenhorn explained that there are &#8220;no or almost no exceptions&#8221; to the rule of opposites, Tr 2882:14, despite some instances of ritualized same sex relationships in some cultures, Tr 2884:25-2888:16. Blankenhorn explained that despite the widespread practice of polygamy across many cultures, the rule of two is rarely violated, because even within a polygamous marriage, &#8220;each marriage is separate.&#8221; Tr 2892:1-3; Tr 2899:16-2900:4&#8243;.</div>
<div id="_mcePaste">.</div>
<div><span style="text-decoration: underline;"><strong>Cultural Construction of Sexual Orientation</strong></span></div>
<div id="_mcePaste">Page 72: ”f. Tr 2176:23-2177:14 (Herek, responding to crossexamination that sexual orientation is a socially constructed classification and not a &#8220;valid concept&#8221;: &#8220;[Social constructionists] are talking about the construction of [sexual orientation] at the cultural level, in the same way that we have cultural constructions of race and ethnicity and social class. * * * But to say that there&#8217;s no such thing as class or race or ethnicity or sexual orientation is to, I think, minimize the importance of that construction.)&#8230;”.</div>
<div id="_mcePaste">.</div>
<div><span style="text-decoration: underline;"><strong>Social Meaning of Marriage in Our Culture</strong></span></div>
<div id="_mcePaste">Pages 80-81: “c. Tr 207:9-208:6 (Cott, describing the social meaning of marriage in our culture: Marriage has been the &#8220;happy ending to the romance.&#8221; Marriage &#8220;is the principal happy ending in all of our romantic tales&#8221;; the &#8220;cultural polish on marriage&#8221; is &#8220;as a destination to be gained by any couple who love one another.&#8221;);</div>
<div id="_mcePaste">d. Tr 2 08:9-17 (Cott: &#8220;Q. Let me ask you this. How does the cultural value and the meaning, social meaning of marriage, in your view, compare with the social meaning of domestic partnerships and civil unions? A. I appreciate the fact that several states have extended-maybe it&#8217;s many states now, have extended most of the material rights and benefits of marriage to people who have civil unions or domestic partnerships. But there really is no comparison, in my historical view, because there is nothing that is like marriage except marriage.&#8221;).”.</div>
<div id="_mcePaste">.</div>
<div><span style="text-decoration: underline;"><strong>Cultural Meaning of Marriage vs. Domestic Partnerships</strong></span></div>
<div id="_mcePaste">Page 82: “ 54. The availability of domestic partnership does not provide gays and lesbians with a status equivalent to marriage because the cultural meaning of marriage and its associated benefits are intentionally withheld from same-sex couples in domestic partnerships.”.</div>
<div>.</div>
<div><span style="text-decoration: underline;"><strong>Cultural Trappings of Statutes Is Clear Message of Inferiority</strong></span></div>
<div id="_mcePaste">Page 87: “b. PX1273 M V Lee Badgett, When Gay People Get Married at 58, 59, 60 (NYU 2009): &#8220;Many Dutch couples saw marriage as better because it had an additional social meaning that registered partnership, as a recent political invention, lacked.&#8221; &#8220;In some places, the cultural and political trappings of statuses that are not marriage send a very clear message of difference and inferiority to gay and lesbian couples.&#8221; &#8220;[W]hen compared to marriage, domestic partnerships may become a mark of second-class citizenship and are less understood socially. In practice, these legal alternatives to marriage are limited because they do not map onto a well-developed social institution that gives the act of marrying its social and cultural meaning.&#8221;.</div>
<div>.</div>
<div><span style="text-decoration: underline;"><strong>Cultural Issues of Stability in Asian Families</strong></span></div>
<div id="_mcePaste">Page 107: ”o. Tr 1913:17-1914:12 (Tam: Tam supported Proposition 8 because he thinks &#8220;it is very important that our children won&#8217;t grow up to fantasize or think about, Should I marry Jane or John when I grow up? Because this is very important for Asian families, the cultural issues, the stability of the family.&#8221;.</div>
<div>.</div>
<div><span style="text-decoration: underline;"><strong>Culturally Superiority of Same-sex Marriage vs. Domestic Partnership</strong></span></div>
<div id="_mcePaste">Page 116: “The evidence at trial shows that domestic partnerships exist solely to differentiate same-sex unions from marriages. FF 53-54. A domestic partnership is not a marriage; while domestic partnerships offer same-sex couples almost all of the rights and responsibilities associated with marriage, the evidence shows that the withholding of the designation &#8220;marriage&#8221; significantly disadvantages plaintiffs. FF 52-54. The record reflects that marriage is a culturally superior status compared to a domestic partnership. FF 52. California does not meet its due process obligation to allow plaintiffs to marry by offering them a substitute and inferior institution that denies marriage to same sex couples.”.</div>
<div></div>
<address><strong>For the complete texts of the Decisions, send an e-mail to Admin.</strong></address>
</div>
]]></content:encoded>
			<wfw:commentRss>http://abbashadjian.com/2010/08/%e2%96%a0-california-culture-proposition-8/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
	</channel>
</rss>

